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OVERVIEW 
When the Trade Marks Directive (“TMD”)1 was born in 1989, 
its European parents could hardly have foreseen the environment 
that it would grow up in.  Transposed into domestic laws in the 
early 1990s, it entered a world that was on the cusp of fundamental 
change.  The Berlin Wall had just come down, consumers were 
starting to own home computers and Netscape was soon to 
introduce its internet browser.  The world wide web and the 
 
1        First Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EC), repealed by Council 
Directive 2008/95, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25, 32 (EU) [herinafter TMD]. 
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European Union (“EU”) were opening for business.  Yahoo! and 
Google were dots on the horizon, with eBay and Facebook not far 
behind.  Meanwhile, advances in computing and printing 
technology meant illicit traders were able to make counterfeits 
faster and more cheaply than ever before.  A few years later, 
Thomas Friedman declared, much to Aristotle’s surprise, that the 
world had become flat.2 
Set against this avalanche of innovation and globalization, EU 
trademark law has coped remarkably well.  Nevertheless, some 
aspects of EU trademark law are due for reconsideration.  
Acknowledging this, the European Commission (the 
“Commission”) sponsored a report into the functioning of the 
European trademark system at the EU and national level, which 
was presented by the Max Planck Institute in early 2011 (the “Max 
Planck Study”).3  The Max Planck Study proposed procedural and 
substantive reform, although some controversial issues have been 
put to one side.4  At the time of writing, the Commission has not 
formally responded to the Max Planck Study, but it is understood 
that the Commission was consulted during its preparation and that 
many of the Max Planck Study’s recommendations are likely to be 
followed.5  Now—as the Commission reviews its options—is a 
good time to take stock of how far we have come along the road to 
harmonization, and to look at what the future could hold. 
We seek to do this by considering three mainstays of trademark 
law and practice.  First, we examine the extent to which the EU has 
successfully harmonized the substantive principles of trademark 
 
 2 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (2006). 
 3 Philipp Venohr and Roland Knaak, Study on the Overall Functioning of the 
European Trade Mark System, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND COMPETITION LAW (2011), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/tm/ 
20110308_allensbach-study_en.pdf [hereinafter Max Planck Study]. 
 4 See generally id.  “Although the lengthy study covers a large number of points, we 
have an informal understanding that any issue which proved controversial was left out of 
the Study.” JAMES MELLOR QC, ET AL., KERLY’S LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE 
NAMES, para. 1-005 n. 11 (15th ed. 2011). 
 5 Alexander von Mülendahl, The Max-Planck-Study “Study on the Overall 
Functioning of the European Trade Mark System”: Background, Findings, Proposals, 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES TRADE MARK ASSOCIATION (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.ecta.org/IMG/pdf/519b-_von_muhlendal_2_.pdf.  
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law.  We argue that the TMD, the Community Trade Mark 
Regulation (“CTMR”),6 and judgments under them, have together 
made significant harmonizing steps, but that recent ‘new media’ 
decisions have begun to muddy the waters.  Secondly, we consider 
the rather lackluster attempts to harmonize certain EU trademark 
evidence and enforcement rules.  In particular, these attempts make 
it unclear whether the Community Trade Mark (“CTM”) will ever 
meet its stated goal of being a unitary right across the whole EU.  
Thirdly, we assess the caseload of the EU’s trademark institutions, 
and consider how those institutions may need to adapt over the 
next twenty years, particularly if the current appetite for European 
judicial guidance continues.  We conclude by reflecting on how 
EU trademark law might mature in the context of international and 
foreign norms. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE EU TRADEMARK LAW: HARMONIZATION 
SUCCESSES AND RECENT DIVERSIONS 
Harmonizing substantive trademark law was a core aim of the 
TMD and the CTMR.7  We consider below whether this target has 
been met by examining two hotly disputed areas of trademark law: 
exhaustion and the trademark infringement tests.  In particular, we 
consider how these issues have been influenced by modern judicial 
views on trademark functions, which seem to have taken on a life 
of their own.  We also investigate how EU trademark infringement 
has contorted to address new technologies, and whether the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has—openly as well as 
by stealth—broadened the scope of registered trademark 
protection, even in the face of objection from Member States. 
A. Exhaustion: Free Markets within “Fortress Europe” 
A trademark proprietor’s rights are—subject to certain 
exceptions—exhausted in respect of goods that are put on the 
 
 6 Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) (EC), repealed by Council Regulation 
207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1, 38 (EC) [herinafter CTMR]. 
 7 See TMD, supra note 1, recital 1; CTMR, supra note 6, at recital 1.  
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relevant market, under the trademark, by him or with his consent.8  
For more than twenty years, the scope of EU trademark exhaustion 
has been hard fought, typically between parallel traders, who seek 
to profit from price differences across markets, and the trademark 
owners, who wish to retain control of their branded goods.  This 
tension is evident in the case law, but the EU has at least succeeded 
in harmonizing the fundamental principles of trademark 
exhaustion. 
1. Geographical Scope 
The harmonization of EU exhaustion began with an important 
trade policy choice about geographical scope.  European Economic 
Area-wide (“EEA”)9 exhaustion enhances free movement of goods 
within the EEA but arguably creates an artificial trade barrier 
around the EEA.  International exhaustion, on the other hand, 
could result in European markets being flooded with grey goods 
from elsewhere. 
The scope of trademark exhaustion also has implications for 
trademark functions, in particular whether EU trademark law 
should do more than protect a trademark’s ability to guarantee 
origin.10  In a typical exhaustion case, a genuine product destined 
for a non-EEA market is imported into the EEA, where the 
trademark owner’s identical or similar products are already 
available.  If EU exhaustion laws allow a trademark owner to 
prohibit that importation, the prohibition is unlikely to just be 
about guaranteeing the origin of goods for consumers, as both the 
EEA and foreign goods came from the same company group.  The 
prohibition might instead be rationalized as a decision to protect 
other trademark functions, or explained as trade policy trumping 
trademark norms. 
Attempting to harmonize the geographical scope of trademark 
exhaustion, the TMD and CTMR codified the long-established 
principle that free movement of goods within the EEA requires 
 
 8 See TMD, supra note 1, art. 7(1); CTMR supra note 6, art. 13(1). 
 9 European Economic Area Agreement, EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 10 Tuomas Mylly, A Silhouette of Fortress Europe? International Exhaustion of Trade 
Mark Rights in the EU, 7 M.J. 1, 17 (2000). 
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trademark exhaustion on an EEA-wide basis.11  However, for 
many years it was unclear whether Member States could allow 
exhaustion on a wider—even international—basis.  The CJEU, in 
Silhouette v. Hartlauer, ruled that they could not.12  This decision 
was probably inevitable in the sense that free movement of goods 
requires each Member State to abide by the same rules.  Allowing 
mixed international and EEA exhaustion within Europe would, in 
practice, result in significant uncertainty regarding the ability to 
import and on-sell grey goods. 
Nevertheless, the decision was politically controversial: critics 
of “fortress Europe” argued that EEA-only exhaustion would 
unnecessarily restrict price competition and consumer freedom.13  
In addition, only four Member States openly supported EEA-only 
exhaustion at the time.14  The European Commission subsequently 
investigated the merits of all Member States adopting international 
exhaustion,15 but ultimately proposed that no changes be made.  
 
 11 The present wording of the TMD and the CTMR only relates to the EU market.  
However, the Agreement on the EEA provides that exhaustion also occurs under the 
TMD if the goods are released in any EEA Member State. European Economic Area 
Agreement Protocol 1 on Horizontal Adaptations, at No. 8 (July 14, 2012), 
http://www.efta.int/~/media/Documents/legal-texts/eea/the-eea-
agreement/Protocols%20to%20the%20Agreement/protocol1.pdf.  The position is 
currently unclear on the face of the CTMR. See Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 124.  
The Max Planck Study proposes that, for clarity, it should be set out in both the TMD and 
CTMR that exhaustion applies in relation to the entire EEA, not just the EU. Id. 
 12 Silhouette, 1998 E.C.R. I-4799 at ¶ 4. Accord Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc. v. GB-
Unic SA, 1999 E.C.R. I-4114, ¶ 4; see also Joined Cases C-414, 415 & 416/99, Zino 
Davidoff SA v. A&G Imports, 2001 E.C.R. I-08691, ¶ 45 (clarifying that only specific 
goods are exhausted–not later batches of identical or similar goods–and that the rights 
owner’s unequivocal consent is required). 
 13  See Mylly, supra note 10, at 14. 
 14 Communiqué from Commissioner Bolkestein on the Issue of Exhaustion of Trade 
Mark Rights, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (June 7, 2000), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
indprop/docs/tm/comexhaust_en.pdf [hereinafter Communiqué] (reporting how four 
Member States supported the Commission’s ultimate decision to require EEA-wide 
exhaustion, eight did not, and the remainder expressed no position); see also Council of 
Eur. Union 2117th Council Meeting—Internal Mkt., Brussels, European Comm’n, at 11 
(Sept. 24, 1998).   
 15 See NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE CHOICE OF REGIME OF EXHAUSTION IN THE AREA OF TRADEMARKS 2 (1999). 
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The effects on pricing were predicted to be too small for it to be 
worth allowing unrestricted international parallel trade.16 
Although not acknowledged as such at the time, the Silhouette 
judgment was also a departure from trademark function orthodoxy.  
Many of the landmark CJEU exhaustion cases before the TMD and 
CTMR focused on protecting a trademark’s “essential” function to 
guarantee the origin of goods or services.17  That function was 
particularly relevant in the exhaustion cases where separate entities 
owned trademarks for the same brand in different countries and 
one of them sought to prevent the import of the other’s goods into 
the former’s territory.  The Silhouette decision went beyond the 
essential function18: it was possible to prohibit the import into the 
EEA of genuine goods first put on the market outside the EEA 
even if their source could be identified.19 
2. Legitimate Reasons to Oppose Further Commercialization 
The CJEU continued to expand the relevance of “non-
essential” trademark functions in a further line of exhaustion cases 
on trademark owners’ rights to oppose, for “legitimate reasons,” 
the “further commercialization” of genuine goods put on the 
market in the EEA.20 
 
 16 The National Economic Research Associates report showed that the impact on 
prices was predicted to vary widely across different sectors, with price decreases ranging 
from negligible in the drinks sectors to around two percent for consumer electronics and 
domestic appliances. See id. at 27; see also Communiqué, supra note 14. 
 17 See, e.g., Case 119/75, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer 
& Co., 1976 E.C.R. I-01039, ¶¶ 5–6; Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG GF AG, 
1990 E.C.R. I-3711, ¶ 14. 
 18 The pre-eminence of the “essential” function was codified in the TMD and the 
CTMR, as follows: “the function of which is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as 
an indication of origin.” TMD, supra note 1, recital 11; CTMR, supra note 6, recital 8.  
The rights conferred by a trademark registration “cannot continue to operate if the mark 
loses its commercial raison d’être, which is to create an outlet for the goods or services 
that bear the sign of which it is composed, as distinct from the goods of other 
undertakings.” Case C-495/07, Silberquelle GmbH v. Maselli-Strickmode GmbH, 2009 
E.C.R. I-00137, ¶ 18. 
 19 See generally Silhouette, 1998 E.C.R. I-4799.  On one view, the Silhouette decision, 
acknowledged that protection could extend to a guarantee of quality; the reality is that the 
quality of goods sold under a particular mark may differ depending on where the goods 
are sold. Id.   
 20 See TMD, supra note 1, art. 7(2); CTMR, supra note 6, art. 13(2). 
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In the mid-1990s, it was recognized that a trademark’s function 
as an indicator of quality could—in principle—justify opposing 
further commercialization, albeit in limited circumstances.21  This 
meant that—although necessary repackaging, relabeling and 
rebranding were generally permitted—trademark owners could 
nevertheless object if the alterations were of sufficiently poor 
quality that their mark’s reputation might be affected.22 
In later exhaustion cases, the CJEU also accepted that a 
trademark’s communication, investment and advertising functions 
could be relevant to preventing the on-sale in the EEA of genuine 
goods.23  This has been particularly prominent in decisions 
involving luxury goods, such as perfume and lingerie, where brand 
owners have sought to control EEA marketing and distribution 
channels.24 
The argument put by luxury brand owners has been that an 
impairment of the “mental condition of the goods” or of the 
“allure, prestigious image and aura of luxury” should be a 
legitimate reason to prevent their on-sale.25  The CJEU was not in 
complete agreement.  It held that—in principle—owners of marks 
with a “luxurious and prestigious image” can oppose on-sale of 
goods that have not been physically altered, on the basis of how 
those goods are marketed.26  However, the CJEU acknowledged 
that the legitimate interest of the trademark owner must be 
balanced against that of the reseller in using methods customary in 
 
 21 See Joined Cases C-427, 429 & 436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S, 
1996 E.C.R. I-03514, ¶ 39. 
 22 See id. at ¶ 75; Case C-348/04, Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., 2007 
E.C.R. I-03430, ¶ 17; Case C-143/00, Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., 
2002 E.C.R. I-03762, ¶¶ 32, 61.  
 23 See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior 
SA v. Evora BV, 1997 E.C.R. I-06013, ¶¶ 41–42.  The case involved parallel imports of a 
luxury perfume that were sold and advertised alongside goods of inferior quality. Id. at ¶ 
4.  The initial view was that these functions were merely derivatives of the essential 
function.  See id. at ¶¶ 41–42. 
 24 See generally id.; see also Case C-59/08, Copad SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA, 
2009 E.C.R. I-03421. 
 25 Parfums Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. I-06013 at ¶ 45; Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421 
at ¶¶ 24, 37 (applying the same test). 
 26 Parfums Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. I-06013 at ¶ 45. 
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its sector.27  Confusingly, although the CJEU initially held that a 
brand owner could only succeed if the reseller’s marketing 
“seriously damaged”28 the mark’s reputation, more recent case law 
suggests that any damage to reputation might suffice.29  However 
justified, the latter approach risks creating a two-tier EEA 
exhaustion system: limited exhaustion for luxury brands, broader 
exhaustion for others. 
In summary, although the CJEU has laid out clear rules on (the 
lack of) international exhaustion and (particularly for 
pharmaceuticals) repackaging, more could be done to harmonise 
how trademark law and antitrust rules on selective distribution 
should interact.  The past twenty years of exhaustion cases show a 
shift towards legal recognition for a wide range of trademark 
“functions,” and exemplify the important role of luxury marks in 
shaping EU trademark law.  These have also been key themes in 
the EU infringement cases, to which we now turn. 
B. Infringement and Relative Grounds for Registrability 
Harmonizing the core rules of EU registered trademark 
infringement has been more complex.  This is not surprising given 
the ambitions of the TMD and the CTMR.  The TMD broke new 
ground and expanded trademark protection in many Member 
States, particularly for marks with a reputation.  The CTMR, of 
course, created an entirely new IP right.  However, despite the 
Member States’ differing starting positions, the EU has come a 
long way towards harmonizing this area over the last twenty years, 
as we seek to explain below. 
1. Confusion vs. Association: Avoiding a Harmonized Unfair 
Competition Law 
One of the first challenges facing the TMD (and later the 
CTMR) was how to harmonize the role of confusion in cases 
where the allegedly infringing mark, and/or the goods and services 
sold under it, were merely similar to the claimant’s registered 
 
 27 See id. at ¶ 44; see also Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421 at ¶ 56.  
 28 Parfums Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. I-06013 at ¶ 48.   
 29 Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421 at ¶¶ 55, 57 and 59.  It is not clear from this case 
whether the omission of the word “seriously” was deliberate.   
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mark.30  Too broad an interpretation of “confusion” could have 
protected all trademarks against unfair competition; too narrow an 
interpretation might have left brand owners defenceless. 
The TMD states that, “the likelihood of confusion includes the 
likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark.”31  
Although this phrase had been inserted at the request of the 
Benelux, it was at the time unclear what the reference to 
“association” meant.32  With diverse Member State practices on the 
point, this was one of the first major challenges for harmonizing 
the infringement tests. 
The Benelux view was that the resemblance between marks 
was the determinative factor for infringement: confusion was not 
required.33  On that basis, all marks were protected not only against 
detriment that stemmed from confusion, but also harm caused by 
degradation and dilution of the mark.34  But the Benelux countries 
were among the few Member States advocating this approach.35  In 
the UK, in contrast, Mr. Justice Laddie argued that to hold that 
confusion was not required would have involved a significant 
extension of trademark rights, creating “a new type of monopoly 
 
 30 See TMD, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(b); CTMR, supra note 6, art. 8(1)(b) (refusal on 
relative grounds); see also TMD, supra note 1, art 5(1)(b); CTMR, supra note 6, art. 
9(1)(b) (infringement). 
 31 TMD, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(b). 
 32 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, 
1997 E.C.R. I-6193, ¶ 35. 
 33 See Uniform Benelux Law on Marks, WIPO DATABASE OF INTELL. PROP. 1, 15 (Jan. 
1, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=2899  (listing the 
requirements for infringement); Case A 82/5, Henri Jullien BV v. Vershuere Norbert, 
1984 E.C.C. 14; see also the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. 
I-6193 at ¶¶ 35, 41; Wagamama, Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants, 1995 F.S.R. 713, 724 
(U.K.).  
 34 Professor Gielen outlined the position under Benelux law in cross-examination in 
Wagamama, 1995 F.S.R. 713, 724; see also the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in 
Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193, ¶ 38.  The position was exemplified in the Benelux case of 
Claeryn and Klarein, Case A 74/1, 1 March 1975, Jurisprudence of the Benelux Ct. of 
Justice, at 472, which established protection for trademarks from dilution and denigration 
in circumstances where gin was sold under the earlier mark and cleaning agent under the 
infringing mark; see also Edor v. General Mills Fun, 1978 N.J. 83. 
 35 See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193 at ¶ 35. 
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not related to the proprietor’s trade but in the trade mark itself.”36  
The European Commission also challenged the Benelux 
interpretation.37  These diverging views struck at the very purpose 
of trademark law.  Preventing confusion has its root in protecting 
the “essential” function of marks to guarantee origin and ensure a 
workable trademarks register.38  Prohibiting mere association could 
only be justified by recognizing broader trademark functions, such 
as protecting investment. 
The judicial debate was resolved by the CJEU deciding that 
confusion was the appropriate benchmark.39  Association is now 
only relevant insofar as it demonstrates confusion, with 
“confusion” interpreted to include situations where the public is 
misled into thinking that goods originate from economically or 
legally linked enterprises.40  Benelux lawyers can nevertheless take 
some comfort from the CJEU’s “global appreciation” test for 
confusion, which allows courts to take many relevant factors into 
account.41  In particular, as under pre-TMD Benelux law,42 the 
CJEU has held that—as part of this “global appreciation”—the 
greater the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the greater the 
likelihood of confusion.43  This is a legal fiction that improves the 
scope of protection for distinctive marks.  In practice, it may be 
that the greater a mark’s distinctiveness, the less likely the public is 
 
 36 Wagamama, 1995 F.S.R. 713, 724.  Germany and Austria also regarded confusion 
as an essential requirement. See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Sabel, 1997 
E.C.R. I-6193 at ¶ 38.  In those countries, confusion included confusion as to whether 
undertakings were organizationally or economically linked. Id. 
 37 See Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193 at ¶ 50. 
 38 See id. at ¶ 45. 
 39 See id. at ¶ 64. 
 40 See Case C-425/98, Marca Mode CV v. Adidas AG, 2000 E.C.R. I-4863, ¶ 15; see 
also Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-
12540, ¶ 45. 
 41 Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1998 E.C.R. I-
5510, ¶ 40. 
 42 Case A 82/5, Henri Jullien BV v. Vershuere Norbert, 1984 E.C.C. 14.  A similar 
concept was suggested by the Federal Court of Justice, Germany, which referred to the 
“characterizing force” of a mark, either intrinsically or by virtue of its commercial 
standing. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Sabel BV, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193 at ¶ 
11. 
 43 See Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, 1998 E.C.R. I-5510 at paras. 16–18.  See, e.g., Marca 
Mode CV, 2000 E.C.R. I-4863 at ¶¶ 41–42.  
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to be confused as to origin, but the more likely an association is to 
spring to mind.  So, the “global appreciation” test may have 
opened the door for distinctive marks (including those with a 
reputation) to be protected against mere association.  While this 
position will be more palatable for trademark owners—the greater 
the investment in their trademarks, the broader their protection—it 
is an awkward fit with the “essential” function of a trademark as a 
guarantee of origin. 
2. Marks with a Reputation: An Unfair Competition Law for 
the Rich? 
Benelux trademark law has probably been most influential in 
relation to EU protection for marks with a reputation.  As Gielen 
notes, the introduction of specific rights (against unfair advantage, 
denigration and dilution) for trademarks with a reputation44 was 
based on the principle of protection from prejudice under Benelux 
law.45  This required a change to the national laws of many 
Member States, including the UK.46 
Overall, the principle of providing wider protection to marks 
with a reputation has proved relatively uncontroversial.  Even 
though the transposition of Article 5(2) of the TMD is optional, the 
only Member State not to have adopted this provision to some 
extent is Cyprus.47  It seems unlikely that any other Member State 
would object if—as the Max Planck Study suggests—national 
trademark laws were further harmonized by making mandatory 
 
 44 See TMD, supra note 1, arts. 4(4)(a) and 5(2), CTMR, supra note 6, arts. 8(5) and 
9(1)(c). 
 45 See Charles Gielen, Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in Europe: the First Trade 
Mark Harmonisation Directive of the European Council, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 262, 
267 (1992). 
 46 See generally Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6., c. 22, § 4 (1) (Eng.).  The 
Trade Marks Act only protected owner’s rights where the alleged infringer used a mark 
“identical with [the registered mark] or so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive 
or cause confusion.” Id. 
 47 Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 95. 
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what is already an accepted norm.48  This protection is standard for 
CTMs.49 
The greater challenge has been to define the scope of 
protection for marks with a reputation.  How far should the EU 
follow the Benelux in recognising that trademarks have a range of 
functions, which should be protected as “valuable asset[s] in and of 
[themselves]”?50  While brand owners may support broader 
protection for trademark functions, some courts have seen this as a 
way of creating a general unfair competition law by the back door. 
a) Reputation Protected Against Identical and Similar 
Infringing Goods 
The additional protection for trademarks with a reputation was 
drafted, in the TMD and CTMR, to apply only when the infringing 
goods/services were dissimilar to those for which the mark was 
registered.51  It had originally been considered—in the UK at 
least—that this was because it was “difficult to imagine a situation 
in which there will be no likelihood of confusion” if the infringing 
goods were similar to those covered by the mark with a 
reputation.52  However—in an example of Herculean interpretation 
despite the clear words of the legislation—the CJEU in Davidoff v. 
Gofkid held that the wider protection for marks with a reputation 
also covers situations where the infringing goods/services are 
identical, or similar, to those for which the mark was registered.53 
 
 48 Id. at 251–52. 
 49 Id. at 108. 
 50 Gielen, supra note 45, at 266. 
 51 See TMD, supra note 1, arts. 4(4)(a) and 5(2), CTMR, supra note 6, arts. 8(5) and 
9(1)(c). 
 52 See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma 
AG, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193, ¶ 49.  Peter Prescott similarly suggested that “if a sign is so 
similar that it can help to take unfair advantage/cause detriment even when used on 
dissimilar goods, then it is bound to be close enough to cause origin confusion when used 
on similar goods.” Peter Prescott, Has the Benelux Trade Mark Law Been Written into the 
Directive?, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 99, 101 (1997). 
 53 See Case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie SA v. Gofkid Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-00389, ¶¶ 24–
26.  It was confirmed in Adidas Benelux that if Article 5(2) of the TMD was implemented 
at all by a Member State, then the whole of the Davidoff protection must be made 
available. C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-
12540, ¶ 15. 
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In many ways, this result was unsurprising.  To have held 
otherwise would have left marks with a reputation less well 
protected against identical or similar goods/services than against 
dissimilar goods/services, especially after the CJEU’s narrow 
interpretation of confusion in Sabel v. Puma.54  The CJEU clearly 
considered that nonsensical, confirming the view of the referring 
German Federal Court of Justice that “protection of trade marks 
with a reputation seems even more justified in the case of use of a 
sign for [identical or similar] goods than in a case of use for non-
similar goods.”55  The Davidoff & Cie v. Gofkid extension has not 
proved to be controversial in principle, and the Max Planck Study 
has suggested that the extension should now be codified.56 
However, the Davidoff & Cie v. Gofkid approach was a further 
move away from the traditional protection of the “essential” 
trademark function, as confusion became less relevant to marks 
with a reputation.  The point is particularly pertinent in cases like 
L’Oréal v. Bellure, in which there was an undisputed absence of 
confusion even though the infringing marks were used for identical 
goods.57  However logical the extension of Article 5(2) of the 
TMD, its application has caused discomfort in some Member 
States, particularly where there is no general law against unfair 
competition.58 
 
 54 See Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. I-6193 at ¶ 38.  The CJEU’s narrow interpretation of 
confusion in Sabel had an impact on subsequent cases; see, e.g., Davidoff, 2003 E.C.R. I-
00389 at ¶ 30. 
 55 Davidoff, 2003 E.C.R. I-00389 at ¶ 12.  The CJEU suggested that it had not been 
seriously disputed that protection against identical or similar goods and services must be 
at least as extensive as that against dissimilar goods and services. See id. at ¶¶ 25–26.   
 56 Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 107–08.  The United Kingdom Trade Marks Act 
1994, implementing the TMD, has already been amended to take account of this decision. 
See id. at 107–08. 
 57 See generally Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185. 
 58 The Manual Concerning Opposition Part 5: Trade Marks with Reputation Article 
8(5) CTMR, OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 1, 8, 
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/resource/documents/CTM/legalReferences/partc_tm_reputa
tion.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
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b) Unfair Advantage Broadened; Dilution Narrowed—Or 
Is It? 
It might have been expected that the standard for establishing 
each of unfair advantage, denigration and dilution would be 
materially similar, given that they are all ways of protecting marks 
with a reputation.  However, that is not the case under the CJEU’s 
current jurisprudence.  Instead, brand owners have been left with 
the upper hand in unfair advantage cases, and with an uncertain, 
uphill struggle in dilution cases.  This has resulted from the 
CJEU’s haphazard extension of protection for “additional” 
trademark functions. 
i. Dilution 
It is currently very difficult for EU trademark owners to 
establish infringement by dilution.  The CJEU has held that this 
often requires evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of 
consumers, or a serious likelihood that such a change will occur.59  
This is almost impossible to demonstrate, making EU anti-dilution 
protection of limited use.  In contrast, under U.S. law a famous 
trademark is generally protected against dilution “regardless of the 
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, 
or of actual economic injury.”60 
Some hope for Europe comes from a recent General Court 
decision, in which it was held that trademark owners do not need 
to prove a change, or likely change, in the economic behaviour of 
consumers to demonstrate dilution.61  Instead, the General Court 
held that dilution could be demonstrated if a mark’s ability to 
identify origin had been “weakened.”62  Given the conflict with the 
CJEU’s previous reasoning, this is unlikely to be the end of the 
matter. 
 
 59 Case C-252/07, Intel Corp. Inc v. CPM United Kingdom Ltd., 2008 E.C.R. I-08823, 
¶ 77. 
 60 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2(1) (2006). 
 61 See Case T-570/10, Envtl. Mfg. L.L.P. v. Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 2012 E.C.R. I-___, ¶ 53, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 
LEXIS 6201TJ0570 (May 22, 2012) (not yet reported).  
 62 Id. at ¶ 54 (interpreting CTMR art. 8(5)). 
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However unsatisfactory this uncertainty, the Max Planck Study 
has not proposed changing the status quo, so legislative 
intervention in the short term seems unlikely.  The only 
consolation for brand owners is that, in some circumstances, 
“unfair advantage” infringement is as easy to prove as dilution is 
difficult.63 
ii. Unfair Advantage 
“Unfair advantage” has been interpreted particularly broadly 
by the CJEU.  The key case, L’Oréal v. Bellure, involved the sale 
of budget perfumes that deliberately looked and smelled similar to 
their market-leading counterparts.64  Both parties accepted that 
neither traders nor consumers were likely to be misled.65  There 
was also no evidence that sales of the L’Oréal goods had been 
affected, or that the L’Oréal marks had suffered reputational 
tarnish or dilution.66  Nevertheless, following a “global 
assessment,” the CJEU held that Bellure was likely to have taken 
unfair advantage of L’Oréal’s marks.67  It was unlawful for Bellure 
to “ride on the coat-tails” of L’Oréal’s marks to benefit from and 
exploit their power of attraction, reputation, prestige, and the 
marketing effort invested.68  This was true irrespective of whether 
any harm was caused to the marks themselves.69 
This expansive approach to unfair advantage—which merely 
paid lip service to the term “unfair”—came close to continental 
concepts of unfair competition by “parasitism.”70  This troubled 
many commentators, including the referring court itself.  Lord 
Justice Jacob, in his reluctant implementation of the CJEU 
 
 63 Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 108.  The ease of establishing unfair advantage 
contributed to the Max Planck Study’s conclusion that changes to dilution law were not 
required.  See id. 
 64 Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, ¶ 17. 
 65 Id. at ¶ 18. 
 66 Id. at ¶ 30.  
 67 Id. at ¶¶ 44–45, 48. 
 68 Id. at ¶ 49. 
 69 Id. at ¶ 50. 
 70 Id. at ¶ 41. 
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decision, lamented the CJEU’s failure to differentiate between 
“permissible free riding” and “impermissible free riding.”71 
It is perhaps no surprise that the English courts have been 
willing to narrow the potential ambit of L’Oréal v. Bellure.  
Shortly afterwards, in Whirlpool v. Kenwood, the English Court of 
Appeal held that it was insufficient to show that the defendant had 
merely obtained an advantage; “there must be an added factor” to 
make that advantage unfair.72  Unfairness could not be 
demonstrated in that case, where the defendant had its own well-
established brand and goodwill, did not need to ride on the 
claimant’s coat-tails, and would have been reluctant to be seen to 
be doing so.73  It seems to have been key that Kenwood did not 
intend to imitate Whirlpool’s mark. 
It is difficult to reconcile the CJEU’s broad position in L’Oréal 
v. Bellure74 with the principles articulated by the English Court of 
Appeal in Whirlpool v. Kenwood.75  However, in Interflora v. 
Marks & Spencer, the CJEU took a different approach, expanding 
on the meaning of the phrase “without due cause.”76  The CJEU 
clarified that use that “falls . . . within the ambit of fair 
competition” will not be “without ‘due cause,’” and so will not 
infringe.77  This means, for example, that unfair advantage is 
particularly likely to be demonstrated where the goods are 
imitations, as use of the trademark will not be within the “ambit of 
fair competition.”78  As such, the outcome on the facts—if not the 
reasoning—in Whirlpool v. Kenwood can be made to fit with 
CJEU case law.79 
 
 71 L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535, ¶ 49 (Eng.). 
 72 Whirlpool Corp. v. Kenwood Ltd., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 753, [136] (Eng.). 
 73 Conversely, where intention was evident, courts have more readily found 
infringement of the reputation provisions, even where the infringer already had its own 
reputation.  See, e.g., Specsavers Int’l Healthcare Ltd. v. Asda Stores Ltd., [2012] EWCA 
(Civ) 24, [164]. 
 74 2009 E.C.R. I-05185. 
 75 [2009] EWCA (Civ) 753, [136]. 
 76 Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc., [2012] E.T.M.R. 1, ¶ 91 
(referencing TMD, art. 5(2); CTMR, art. 9(1)(c)). 
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. at ¶¶ 90–91; Case C-236/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 
2010 E.C.R. I-___, ¶¶ 102, 103.  
 79 See MELLOR, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 9-137, 9-141.  
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One key question for the future is how far EU trademark law 
should protect against free riding.80  Increased emphasis on the 
phrase “without due cause” suggests that there are limits to the 
scope of unfair advantage, but leaves open the possibility of an 
amorphous judge-made law against unfair competition.81  To date, 
there seems to be little legislative interest in clarifying this area of 
law.82  However, given the potential for EU disharmony on the 
point, it should be a strong candidate for legislative review over the 
next five to ten years. 
 
3. Double Identity 
The protection of marks with a reputation is not alone in 
requiring reform.  The TMD and CTMR each purport to provide 
absolute protection against the use in trade of a sign that is 
identical to a registered trademark, where it is used for identical 
goods or services.83  A relatively simple provision on its face, the 
test for this double-identity infringement has caused significant 
legal uncertainty. 
A decade ago, the CJEU held that claimants must demonstrate 
that one of the functions of a mark had been affected before 
infringement would be found.84  So, even where a mark was used 
on identical goods, the trademark owner would still have to show 
that a trademark function was harmed.85  This was uncontroversial 
in counterfeit cases, where the origin function would always be 
engaged, but has caused judicial contortions where other functions 
had to be relied on.86 
 
 80 L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 968, [27]. 
 81 Id. at [139]–[141]. 
 82 See, e.g., Directive 2005/29, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22 (EC) (discussing similar concepts 
but failing to address this issue). 
 83 See TMD, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(a) (infringment), art. 5(1)(a) (rights conferred by 
trademark); CTMR, supra note 6, art. 8(1)(a) (relative grounds for refusal),  art. 9(1)(a) 
(rights conferred by Community trade mark). 
84 See Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, ¶¶ 51–
54; Case C-48/05, Adam Opel AG v. Autec AG, 2007 E.C.R. I-01017, paras. 21–22. 
 85 Adam Opel, 2007 E.C.R. I-01017 at ¶ 24. 
 86 L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 968, [28]–[29].  
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The issue has been most acute in the recent proliferation of 
comparative advertising cases, where defendants refer to registered 
trademarks—as online keywords, for example—to advertise 
competing goods.87 
As discussed above, in L’Oréal v. Bellure the reliance on non-
essential trademark functions led to very broad protection against 
“unfair” competition.88  The defendants had also used L’Oréal’s 
registered word marks in comparison lists shown to retailers.89  
The CJEU held that this would infringe the double identity 
provisions if any trademark function—including an “additional” 
function such as investment, communication, or advertising—had 
been adversely affected.90 
This creep of functions analysis prompted a judicial backlash 
in the UK.91  Implementing L’Oréal v. Bellure, Lord Justice Jacob 
made it clear that he would have preferred to find the comparison 
lists lawful, as they only involved “making honest statements about 
their products where those products are themselves lawful.”92  He 
criticised the “[c]onceptually . . . vague and ill-defined”93 nature of 
the “additional” functions, arguing that, once it was established 
that there was no risk of confusion, the consumer’s interest lay in 
free competition.94  The CJEU, he suggested, had “muzzled” the 
defendants, perhaps even breaching their right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.95 
Even though Lord Justice Jacob’s reservations were shared by 
the European Commission in relation to keywords,96 the CJEU has 
 
 87 See, e.g., Case C-236/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 
E.C.R. I-___, ¶¶ 69–73. 
 88 Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, ¶ 65. 
 89 Id. at ¶ 21. 
 90 Id. at ¶ 55–58. 
 91 See, e.g., L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535. 
 92 Id. at paras. 8,  39.  
 93 Id. at ¶ 30. 
 94 See id. at ¶¶ 16–18 (quoting L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 968, 
[28] and various law journal articles). 
 95 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10. 
 96 See, e.g., Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc., 2012 E.T.M.R. 1, 
¶ 38; see also Interflora v. Marks & Spencer No.2 [2010] EWHC 925 (Ch), ¶ 18. 
LON24195639 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2013  2:27 PM 
750 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:731 
 
confirmed that the L’Oréal v. Bellure reasoning applies in that 
context.97  Nevertheless, the CJEU’s analysis of the keywords 
cases means that L’Oréal v. Bellure is unlikely to affect their 
outcome.98  Having accepted that all functions are relevant, the 
CJEU back-pedalled by adding a new layer to the double-identity 
test: the keyword use would—in practice—have to confuse the 
average internet user as to the origin of the goods/services for there 
to be infringement.99  The CJEU has also suggested that use of a 
keyword of itself would not affect the advertising function even if 
the brand owner has to pay a higher “price per click” to promote its 
adverts.100 
The Max Planck Study sums up this position by concluding 
that “referential” uses have not been integrated clearly and 
consistently into the EU legislation.101  This is likely in part 
because of the CJEU’s desire to find infringement in novel 
scenarios where the “essential” function is not compromised.102  In 
one of the few major changes it proposes to the substantive law, 
the study suggests that the TMD and the CTMR Preambles should 
be revised to clarify that “referential” uses of registered marks can 
lead to infringement, but that such uses should be treated 
separately to use of the registered mark in relation to “the alleged 
infringer’s own goods and services.”103  The study suggests that 
analyzing “additional” trademark functions is inappropriate in 
“referential” cases.104  Instead, the same result should be achieved 
by explicitly permitting “referential” uses, provided that they are in 
accordance with “honest business practices” and fall within clearly 
 
 97 See Case C-326/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-
___, ¶¶ 69–71; Interflora, 2012 E.T.M.R. 1 at ¶¶ 34–35. 
 98 See generally Interflora, 2012 E.T.M.R. 1. 
 99 Google Fr. SARL, 2010 E.C.R. I-___ at ¶ 99. 
 100 Id. at ¶¶ 94–95, 98; see also Ilanah Simon Fhima, The Court of Justice’s Protection 
of the Advertising Function of Trade Marks: an (Almost) Sceptical Analysis, 6 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. & PRAC. 325 (2001) (examining CJEU’s exploration of the advertising function 
little impact on the outcome of cases). 
 101 Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 122. 
 102 Max Planck Study, supra note 5 at 103–04. See, e.g., Case C-487/07 L’Oréal SA v. 
Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, ¶ 65. 
 103 Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 122. 
 104 Id. 
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articulated defences, which might include a new defence of 
“honest referential use.”105 That would create judicial breathing 
space for the traditional double identity cases, for which—as 
Article 16.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)106 notes—confusion should 
not be in issue. 
C. Going Forward 
In summary, the harmonization of substantive EU trademark 
law over the last 20 years has been largely successful.  
Nevertheless, as technology has offered new ways to compete, 
harmonization efforts have, at times, struggled to keep up.  Recent 
attempts to rely on trademarks’ “communication, advertising, [and] 
investment” functions have, unfortunately, risked jettisoning the 
legal certainty107 that is assumed to be crucial to the EU’s e-
commerce agenda. 
The Max Planck Study proposes that the purpose and scope of 
trademark protection, including a full account of all protected 
functions, be outlined in the Preambles to the TMD and CTMR.108  
This would certainly be a good start.  The EU might also consider 
 
 105 Id. at 115, 121–24.  The Max Planck Study proposes that business practices that are 
not honest under Article 6 of the TMD and Article 12 of the CTMR be clarified as 
meaning any use of a sign that creates the impression of a link, “affects the reputation or 
distinctive character of the mark or . . . discredits or denigrates the mark.” Id.  The 
position put forth in the study is complicated by the interrelation between the TMD, 
CTMR, and the Comparative Advertising Directive of December 12, 2006 (“CAD”). 
Council Directive 06/114, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 21 (EU).  The expansive interpretation of 
Articles 4(g) and 4(f) CAD in L’Oréal means that the TMD and CTMR defences are not 
available if imitations or replicas are involved. L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA 
(Civ) 535 [37] (Eng.).  An overhaul of the CAD itself would be required before such uses 
were permitted.  Although outside the scope of the Max Planck Study, one of its authors, 
Annette Kur, has also suggested Article 4(g) CAD should be deleted. See Annette Kur, 
The Institute of Brand and Innovation Law Lecture, Trade Marks: The Future of the 
Advertising Function, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1, 5 
(Mar. 23, 2011), available at  http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/ibil/docs/11_brands_kur.pdf.  It 
appears that Lord Justice Jacob would also favour such a development. See L’Oréal SA v. 
Bellure NV, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535 [37] (Eng.). 
106    Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS], Apr. 
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 
 107 See Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 103. 
 108 Id. at 105, 114–16. 
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reviewing the extent to which unfair competition laws, including 
the EU’s unregistered trademark protection, merit harmonization.  
The registered trademark infringement cases still show significant 
potential for diverging trademark philosophies.  Until the EU can 
articulate the purposes of modern trademarks with greater clarity, 
and agree on the extent to which those purposes should benefit 
from legal protection, we can still expect national courts to offer 
their view of what the CJEU really means.  However far the 
harmonization of substantive EU trademark law has come, even 
the Max Planck Study leaves the next generation with plenty to 
think about. 
II. CTM UNITARY PROTECTION AND PAN-EU REMEDIES 
The harmonization of substantive trademark law, which was 
initiated by the TMD in 1988, is only part of the story.  In 
particular, the TMD and the CTMR left the harmonization of 
procedural, evidence and enforcement rules on the back-burner.109  
This, in turn, left open questions that go to the core of whether a 
CTM is a unitary right, with equal effect across the whole EU.110 
To illustrate the difficulties that this has caused in practice, we 
discuss below three evidence- or enforcement-related issues that 
have the potential to undermine the purpose of the CTM system.  
First, we consider where a CTM should be used to sustain 
registration.  Secondly, we look at the impact this has had on the 
cluttered CTM register and co-existence with other national marks 
and CTMs.  Thirdly, in cases where a CTM court has 
“international” jurisdiction,111 we discuss whether the CTM owner 
is entitled to a pan-EU injunction.  We conclude by considering 
whether the EU is ready for a more fundamental shift: using the 
CTM regime as a replacement for all national marks. 
 
 109 For example, the CTMR acknowledged that “[o]n all matters not covered by this 
Regulation a Community trade mark court shall apply its national law.” Council 
Regulation 207/2009, art. 101, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1, 24 (EC).  
 110 Id. at art. 1(2). 
 111 See id. at art. 97–98. 
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A. Where Must a CTM be Used: EU Co-Existence 
The increased use of CTMs and the EU expansion have led to 
difficult questions.  First, to what extent is use of the CTM in a 
small geographical area, even just one Member State, sufficient to 
demonstrate “genuine use in the Community” and so prevent a 
CTM from being revocable?112  Secondly, if CTMs can be 
sustained by use within a small geographical area, should 
restrictions be placed on the registration of similar marks 
elsewhere in the EU, even where there is no prospect of 
commercial conflict? 
1. Where Must a CTM be Used? 
The first point remains open following the CJEU’s decision in 
Leno Merken v. Hagelkruis Beheer.113  Advocate-General 
Sharpston’s opinion in that case proposed that use in only one 
Member State may be sufficient, although it is not necessarily 
so.114  She considered the relevant geographical area to be the 
entire territory of the internal market.115  Accordingly, all forms of 
use within this area should be examined on a case-by-case basis in 
order to determine whether the use “is sufficient to maintain or 
create market share” and contribute to a “commercially relevant 
presence” in the internal market: “The borders between Member 
States and the respective sizes of their territories are not pertinent 
to this enquiry.”116  However, “use of a mark on a website that is 
accessible in all of the 27 Member States is not,” of itself, 
necessarily enough.117  The CJEU came to a similar conclusion. In 
particular, it agreed that territorial borders should be disregarded in 
assessing whether a CTM has been put to genuine use in the EU. 
 
 112 See id. at art. 15 
 113 Case C-149/11, Leno Merken BV v. Hagelkruis Beheer BV, 2012 E.C.R. I-___ 
(delivered 19 December 2012) (not yet reported).  Note: The decision of the Benelux 
Trade Mark Office provided that the use in one Member State should not “by definition” 
constitute use in the Community, particularly in the light of an expanded EU.  
 114 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-149/11, Leno Merken BV v. 
Hagelkruis Beheer BV, 2012 E.C.R. I-___ (delivered July 5, 2012) (not yet reported),  at 
¶¶ 39, 55, 64. 
 115 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, id at ¶ 39. 
 116 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, id. at ¶¶ 48–50 (emphasis omitted). 
 117 See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, id. at ¶ 55. 
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Although the test is rather vague, it seems to be a good fit with 
the previous approaches taken by the CJEU, the General Court and 
OHIM, and with the principle of unitary character.118  The Max 
Planck Study also recommends that the requisite nature and extent 
of use of a CTM—both territorial and otherwise—should be 
determined on a case by case basis,119 and that the analysis should 
entirely disregard whether there is use across the boundaries of 
Member States.120  The corresponding finding by the CJEU should 
be reasonably good news for trademark owners: at the very least, 
they should not be required to show use in every EU country.  
Registration of one CTM will enable trademark owners to build up 
their brand in part of Europe, while reserving the right to roll out 
use of the mark across the continent at a later date. 
2. Co-Existence Challenges 
There is a concern, though, that this liberalization of the ability 
to maintain CTMs will lead to a cluttered register.  It could also 
unnecessarily curtail uses of similar marks in Member States 
where there will, in practice, be no commercial conflict.  This is 
especially true across as wide and culturally diverse an area as the 
EU. 
To facilitate co-existence in these circumstances, EU law 
prevents the owners of both national marks and CTMs from 
objecting to use of a later registered mark if they have acquiesced 
 
 118 See Case C-40/01, Ansul BV v. Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV, 2003 E.C.R. I-2439; 
Case C-259/02, La Mer Tech. Inc. v. Laboratoires Goemar SA, 2004 E.C.R. I-1159; Case 
C-416/04, Sunrider Corp. v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade 
Marks and Designs), 2006 E.C.R. I-4237; see also Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 
133.  The Advocate General’s approach in Leno Merken BV v. Hagelkruis Beheer BV 
also fits with the CJEU’s previous finding in Case C-301/07 PAGO Int’l GmbH v. 
Tiromilch registrierte Genossenschaft mbH that a dilution claim could be founded on the 
basis of a CTM’s reputation in only one EU Member State, although the Advocate 
General specifically stated that this reasoning could not be transposed directly to the 
question of genuine use.  Compare Leno Merken, with Case C-301/07, PAGO Int’l 
GmbH v. Tirolmilch Registrierte Genossenschaft mbH, 2009 E.C.R. I-9429. 
 119 Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 139.  The Max Planck Study proposes that 
relevant factual circumstances should include the nature of the goods and services, the 
sector, and the size and type of the business activities. Id. at 139–40.   
 120 See id. at 135. 
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in the use of the later mark for five successive years.121   
Acquiescence offers some respite, but provides no immediate 
certainty for the owners of later marks.  The authors of the Max 
Planck Study propose that the EU should go one step further by 
forcing legislative co-existence between CTMs and later national 
marks in certain narrowly defined circumstances (and without any 
need to show acquiescence).122  To protect the unitary character of 
the CTM, the CTM owner could still expand use of the CTM into 
the relevant Member State at a later date, but the right to oppose 
use of the national mark would be curtailed. 
It is still unclear whether the European Commission will act on 
this particular recommendation.  However, the proposals outlined 
in the Max Planck Study do at least put on the agenda one of the 
major problems that the EU is likely to face in the years to come: 
balancing its desire to improve the appeal of CTMs against 
preventing the register from becoming unworkable.  It may be that 
forced co-existence will not unduly concern most CTM owners.  
However, it will operate as yet another limitation on the general 
principle that relief from infringement should be available on an 
EU-wide basis for all CTMs.  We turn now to the problems this 
has caused in a related area: the availability of pan-EU remedies 
when linguistic differences mean that a defendant’s mark may not 
infringe on a pan-EU basis. 
 
 121 CTMR, supra note 6, at art. 54(1).  See also TMD, supra note 1, at art. 9(1).  The 
application for registration must have been made in good faith and the owner of the 
earlier trademark must know that the later trademark has been registered and used after 
its registration. See id.  Registration of the earlier trademark is not necessary for the 
running of the five-year period. See id. (“where there has been a long period of honest 
concurrent use of those two trademarks where . . . that use neither has nor is liable to 
have an adverse effect on the essential function of the trade mark”). Case C-482/09 
Budějovický Budvar, národní podnik v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2011 E.C.R. I-___, ¶ 84 
(delivered Sept. 22, 2011) (not yet reported). 
 122 Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 136–39.  To keep the operation of this forced co-
existence within justifiable limits, the Max Planck Study proposes: (i) that the CTM must 
have been used only on a minimal basis and in a part of the Community remote from the 
relevant Member State, (ii) that sufficient time (fifteen years) is allowed to establish 
wider use, and (iii) that the later national mark must have been applied for in good faith. 
Good faith might be impossible to demonstrate where the relevant market sector was so 
small that minor activities would have an EU-wide impact. Id. 
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B. Barriers to pan-EU relief 
The Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive123 has 
harmonized some of the basic EU IP infringement remedies, but 
we are yet to receive clear judicial guidance on whether the CTM 
offers truly unitary remedies in the EU.  Unitary rights are of 
limited use without unitary remedies.124  For this reason, a CTM 
court in the Member State in which a claim is properly brought has 
“jurisdiction in respect of: acts of infringement committed or 
threatened within the territory of any of the Member States.”125  In 
principle, therefore, injunctions issued by a CTM court against 
infringement of a CTM should be capable of extending across the 
entire EU.126 
Unfortunately, the principle of pan-EU jurisdiction is 
complicated by the wide linguistic divergence within the EU.127  
The difficulty is that trademarks are only protected under EU law 
to the extent that their legally recognised functions are affected.128  
The use of a later mark across the EU might affect the functions of 
a CTM in some EU countries, but not others.  This is most likely to 
occur where the infringement arises from confusion caused by the 
similar pronunciation of the two marks in one or more languages, 
but where the two marks are pronounced differently in other 
languages.  For example, on this approach, a mark might infringe 
the “essential function” of a CTM in Germany, because local 
 
 123 Directive 2004/48, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45 (EU). 
 124 The CTMR recognizes this, stating that rights owners should be able “by means of 
one procedural system [to] obtain Community trade marks to which uniform protection is 
given and which produce their effects throughout the entire area of the Community.” 
CTMR, supra note 6, at Recital (3), Recital (16), art. 1(2). 
 125 See CTMR, supra note 6, at art. 98(1)(a) (emphasis added).  But see id. at arts. 
97(5), 98(1) CTMR (noting that this rule does not apply where jurisdiction is founded on 
the place where the infringement occurred). 
 126 Case C-235/09, DHL Express France SAS v. Chronopost SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-___, ¶ 
44 (delivered Apr. 12, 2011) (not yet reported). 
 127 European Commission, Speaking for Europe: Languages in the European Union, at 
7 (2008), available at ec.europa.eu/education/languages/pdf/doc3275_en.pdf.  The EU is 
comprised of twenty-seven Member States with more than twenty official languages (not 
to mention sixty regional and minority languages). Id. 
 128 See, e.g., Google Fr. SARL, 2010 E.C.R. I-___, ¶¶ 75–79; DHL Express France, 
2011 E.C.R. I-___ at ¶ 46. 
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pronunciation leads to a likelihood of confusion.  However, the 
same mark might not infringe in France where it is pronounced 
differently.  In such cases, the CJEU has suggested that use of the 
later mark should only be prohibited in those Member States in 
which confusion would arise.129  Arguably, the notoriety of the 
mark could also be relevant, especially if the trademark owner has 
taught the relevant public how to pronounce the mark. 
This significantly curtails the unitary character of CTMs.  
Defendants who use their mark across the EU can now force 
claimants to establish infringement in each official language—a 
tall order that may price many trademark proprietors out of 
enforcing their rights in multiple countries.  The alternative may 
have its disadvantages (for example, it might feel like rough justice 
to grant a pan-EU injunction to the extent that confusion is limited 
to only a few Member States) but it is surely more in line with 
trademark owners’ expectations from a supposedly unitary CTM 
system.  This is a difficult policy question for the EU, but ought to 
be resolved if trademark applicants are expected to be able to 
assess the true value of seeking CTMs rather than national marks. 
C. Replacement of National Marks 
Proposals for the harmonization of national trademark law and 
the introduction of CTMs were made around the same time, back 
in 1980.130  In the end, it was the TMD that came first, as 
harmonizing national laws was seen as a necessary first step to 
enable the establishment of a CTM system.131  Has the time now 
come to take the final leap and remove national marks altogether?  
Would this even be desirable? 
We suggest not.  At a time when the concern is to de-clutter the 
register, forcing CTM registrations when national registrations 
would suffice seems to be a move in the wrong direction.132  From 
a brand owner’s perspective, there may also be tactical reasons for 
registering national marks.  For example, applying for national 
 
 129 DHL Express France, 2011 E.C.R. I-___ at ¶¶ 46–48.  
 130 Proposal for a First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member 
States Relating to Trade Marks, COM (1980) 635 Final (Nov. 19, 1980). 
 131 See Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, supra note 4, ¶ 1-004. 
 132 See Max Planck Study, supra note 5, at 270. 
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registrations avoids having to manage potentially conflicting marks 
in countries that are not of commercial interest.  A split system will 
also mean that national marks continue to be assessed on their 
merits by the trademark institutions that are closest to them.  For 
example, the CJEU recently confirmed that the validity of earlier 
national marks can only be challenged in national proceedings.133   
This means that the General Court cannot hold that an earlier 
national trademark lacks distinctive character.  For now, at least, 
the advantages of a dual system continue to outweigh the 
disadvantages—particularly if the issues outlined above can be 
resolved. 
III. THE EU TRADEMARK INSTITUTIONS 
Over the last twenty years the trademark-related caseload of 
the EU institutions has grown considerably.  In part a natural 
consequence of the TMD and the CTMR, this growth has also been 
spurred on by self-promotion from OHIM.  The result has been 
increased pressure on EU judicial capacity.  Unfortunately, 
however, the appetite to resolve the capacity squeeze remains 
relatively modest.  This section outlines the rise of the EU 
trademark institutions over the past twenty years, and considers 
whether the next twenty years will herald a more radical shake up: 
a specialised central EU trademark court. 
A. Increasing Caseloads: the Facts 
As is apparent from sections II and III above, the EU judicial 
institutions have been kept busy with requests to interpret EU 
trademark law.  The statistics set out below show a dramatic rise in 
the amount of court and registry time devoted to trademarks.  In 
particular: 
 
 133   Case C-196/11 P, Formula One Licensing BV v. Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 2012 E.C.R. I-___, ¶ 38 (delivered May 24, 
2012) (not yet reported). 
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 the number of new CTM applications at OHIM has 
more than doubled since the mid-1990s;134 
 the CJEU and the General Court have, respectively, 
37% and 109% more new cases each year than they did 
ten years ago;135 and 
 over that period, the number of new IP cases started 
each year has more than doubled for the CJEU, and is 
almost five times higher for the General Court.136 
The number of CJEU and General Court judges has lagged 
behind this growing caseload.  The only additional judicial 
appointments have been made when a new country joined the 
EU.137  This constraint on judicial capacity could lead to 
significant delays in access to justice.  The figures speak for 
themselves. 
1. OHIM 
In the past few years, OHIM processed approximately 100,000 
CTM applications annually, up from just fewer than 44,000 in 
1996.138  There are likely to be several reasons for the uptake of the 
CTM.  Firstly, following the reduction of CTM e-filing application 
fees, OHIM received almost 20% more CTM applications in 2006 
 
 134 See Statistics of Community Trade Marks 2012, Overview: Applications, OFFICE OF 
HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET, 1 (Mar. 9, 2012), 
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/resource/documents/OHIM/statistics/ssc009-statistics_ 
of_community_trade_marks_2012.pdf [hereinafter CTM Statistics] (on 4 December 2012 
99,254 applications for 2012 had been reported, but based on the previous two years this 
total will most likely reach over 100,000). 
 135 See id.  Statistics for the past ten years are based on the authors’ aggregation of 
available data.  The increased workload of the courts is not just due to trademarks. The 
EU’s judicial institutions have also had to cope with EU expansion and a wider 
jurisdictional remit, including under REACH, the EU’s chemicals regime. 
 136 See id.  
 137 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 
O.J. (C 83) 13, 27, art. 19(2).  There must be one judge from each Member State in the 
CJEU and at least one judge from each Member State in the General Court (and since the 
General Court’s creation it has had only one judge per Member State). Id.  The new 
appointments equated to an eighty percent increase in the number of judges over this ten-
year period.  The History of the European Union, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/eu-history/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2012). 
 138 See CTM Statistics, supra note 134, at 1 (demonstrating that there were 105,900 
CTM applications in 2011 and 98,343 CTM applications in 2010). 
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than in 2005.139  The percentage of applications filed electronically 
increased from 30% to 70% in that year.140  Secondly, the EU (as a 
combined market) has become a more attractive place to do 
business, particularly since the harmonization of certain e-
commerce laws in the late 1990s141 and early 2000s.142  For 
European companies and foreign investors, the CTM offers a 
convenient and cost-effective one-stop shop that protects their 
brands.  Thirdly, when the European Community joined the 
Madrid Protocol in 2004, it became even easier to apply for CTMs 
and to use the CTM as a basis for other applications.143 
Inevitably, this increased interest in the CTM has had 
tremendous effects for the caseload of the General Court and the 
CJEU. 
2. The General Court 
In 2011, the General Court had an influx of over 300 more new 
cases than in 2000 (see inset graph).144   
 
 139 OHIM, European Trademarks and Designs Newsletter 10 (November 2006), 
available at http://www.oami.europa.eu/en/office/newsletter/06012.htm#ED1. 
 140 See CTM Statistics, supra note 134, at 1–2; OHIM Annual Report 2007, TRADE 
MARKS AND DESIGN REGISTRATION OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 13 (2007), 
http://oami.europa.eu/en/office/press/pdf/AR2.pdf. 
141    Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 
on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts. 
142    Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market. See OHIM, European Trademarks and Designs 
Newletter, supra note 139 at 1.1 (“A Look Back at OHIM in 2006”); see, e.g, Véronique 
Musson, Finding its Feet: 10 Years of OHIM Practice, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. 15 
(Sept.–Oct. 2006) (describing the success of the EU system within the last decade). 
 143  See Musson, supra note 142, at 19. 
 144 Compare Bo Vesterdorf, Proceedings of the Court of First Instance in 2000, 1 
(2000), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/tp2000_2008-
09-30_16-26-3_988.pdf (statistics concerning the judicial activity for the Court of First 
Instance in 2000), with Annual Report 2011, CVRIA 1, 194 (2012), 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-
06/ra2011_version_integrale_en.pdf [hereinafter Annual Report 2011] (statistics 
concerning the judicial activity for the General Court in 2011).  See generally Treaty of 
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 (renaming the Court of First 
Instance, the General Court in 2007). 
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Intellectual Property cases have accounted for about a third of the 
General Court’s workload since 2006.145 
In 2002 and 2006, the number of new IP cases entering the 
General Court increased significantly.146  The 2002 increase can 
probably be attributed to the Community Designs Regulation, 
which came into force the year before.147  In 2006, coinciding with 
OHIM’s reduced CTM e-filing fees (see above), there were 45% 
more appeals from OHIM to the General Court.148 
3. The CJEU 
The story has been similar at the CJEU.  In 2011, the CJEU 
had 185 more new cases than in 2000 (see inset graph, next 
page).149   
 
 145 Annual Report 2011, supra note 144, at 194. 
 146 See Statistics Concerning the Judicial Activity of the Court of First Instance, 173 
(2002), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-10/st02tr.pdf; 
Statistics Concerning the Judicial Activity of the Court of First Instance, 173 (2006), 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/06_trib_stat_2008-09-
29_13-32-40_772.pdf.  In 2005 and 2006, the overall number of new cases in the General 
Court was less than in previous years.  Annual Report 2011, supra note 144, at 211.  This 
may have been due to the introduction of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2005. See Council 
Directive 04/752, 2004 O.J. (L 333) 7 (EU). 
 147 Council Regulation 6/2002/EC of 12 December 2001. 
 148 Board of Appeal Statistics, (Sept. 2012) 1, 2, http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/ 
resource/documents/OHIM/statistics/appeal_stats_2012.pdf. 
 149 Compare Annual Report 2011, supra note 144, at 95, with Statistics of Judicial 
Activity of the Court of Justice (2000), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/ 
docs/application/pdf/2008-10/st00tr.pdf. 
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A significant amount of that increase was due to IP, and—in 
particular—trademark cases. 
The rising number of CJEU trademark cases has been driven 
by many factors, including the willingness of national courts to 
make preliminary references and of trademark owners to appeal 
General Court decisions.  References show little signs of slowing 
down, particularly as national courts rarely characterise the 
trademark effects of new technologies as acte clair.150  The CJEU 
is at least trying to discourage unnecessary appeals from the 
General Court, with recent CJEU decisions confirming the CJEU’s 
reluctance to interfere with the General Court’s findings of fact.151  
The scope of an appeal to the CJEU is now clearly limited to errors 
of law152 or the other narrow grounds set out in the CTMR.153 
 
 150 See generally Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc., [2012] 
E.T.M.R. 1; Joined Cases 236 & 238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton 
Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-___; Case C-558/08, Portakabin Ltd. v. Primakabin BV, 
2010 E.C.R. I-6959. 
 151 See Case C-100/11, Helena Rubinstein SNC v. Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 2012 E.C.R. I-___, ¶ 84 (delivered May 12, 
2012) (not yet reported). 
 152 See Case C-196/11, Formula One Licensing BV v. Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market ((Trade Marks and Designs), 2012 E.C.R. I-___, ¶¶ 56–57 (delivered 
May 24, 2012) (not yet reported). 
 153 CTMR, supra note 6, at art. 65. 
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B. Taking the Strain: Can the EU’s Institutions Cope with their 
Caseload? 
The increasing trademark caseload raises questions about 
whether the EU’s trademark systems are still fit for purpose. 
1. OHIM 
Over the past eighteen years, OHIM has worked hard to 
improve the desirability and accessibility of the CTM.  As outlined 
above, those efforts include reducing filing fees, introducing 
electronic applications, dealing with EU expansion, and joining the 
Madrid Protocol. 
The reception of this success story has, at times, been mixed.  
On the positive side, significant improvements have been made to 
the speed of OHIM decisions.154  OHIM’s current Service Charter, 
a clear statement of its priorities, even includes timeliness 
targets.155  However, concerns remain about whether achieving 
these targets might prejudice the quality and consistency of 
decisions.156  Even with examiners following detailed guidelines, 
there is a risk that certain CTM examinations will miss the nuances 
of EU trademark law. 
If the CTM system is to succeed for the next twenty years, the 
right balance must be struck between CTM examination speed and 
the number of cases that need to be appealed.  There is also a more 
fundamental question: who should be the ultimate gatekeeper for 
CTM applications?  The current pace and frequency with which 
CTM applications are granted,157 along with the growing number 
of General Court and CJEU trademark cases, suggests that OHIM 
is a relatively light filter.  The General Court and, to a lesser 
extent, the CJEU, are frequently required to step in. 
 
 154 See Rhys Morgan, Ensuring Greater Legal Certainty in OHIM Decision-Taking by 
Abandoning Legal Formalism, 7 J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 408, 408 (2012); Edward 
Fennell, Leaving a Legacy, 27 INTELL. PROP.  REV. 32, 32 (2009). 
 155 See generally Timeliness Service Standards 2012, OFFICE OF HARMONIZATION FOR 
THE INTERNAL MARKET (TRADE MARKS & DESIGNS) (May 8, 2012), 
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/QPLUS/serviceCharter/serviceCharter.en.do. 
 156 Morgan, supra note 154, at 408. 
 157  According to statistics published on OHIM’s website, nearly ninety percent of CTM 
applications in 2011 were granted. 
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There are signs that the CJEU would like OHIM to take greater 
responsibility for the accuracy of examinations.  For example, the 
CJEU has recently affirmed that OHIM examiners must take into 
account decisions on previous, similar applications in order to 
ensure consistency and legal certainty.158  Of itself, though, this is 
unlikely to deter sophisticated trademark owners from appealing 
adverse CTM examination decisions, especially as appeal costs 
remain relatively low.159 
What is needed, we suggest, is a three-pronged approach.  
First, OHIM’s processes need to be robust enough to give 
applicants the confidence that examination decisions will be 
consistent and in line with EU trademark law.  That may result in 
increased OHIM fees, but it is appropriate for this cost be met by 
trademark applicants rather than the EU taxpayers who fund 
appeals to the General Court and CJEU.160  Secondly, the General 
Court needs to increase its capacity and expertise to hear appeals 
from the OHIM Board of Appeal, as we set out in more detail in 
the next sub-section.  Thirdly, trademark examination appeals to 
the CJEU should be available to rights owners only in rare cases. 
2. The General Court and the CJEU 
The statistics set out above, and the trademark support needed 
by OHIM, suggest that the current workload pressures on the 
General Court and CJEU are unlikely to subside without 
intervention.  The issue is most acute for the General Court but 
there are also capacity concerns at the CJEU.161 
 
 158 See, e.g., Case C-51/10 P, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp z o.o. v. Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 2011 E.C.R. I-___, ¶ 
74 (delivered Mar. 10, 2011) (not yet reported).  
 159  See List of Fees Following Commission Regulation (EC) No 355/2009 of 31 March 
2009, Office for Harmonization of the Internal Market (Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/CTM/feesPayment/listFees.en.do. 
160  Under the CTMR, OHIM retains largely autonomous budget control, funded 
principally by users’ fees. See Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L78) 1, 2 (EC).  
 161 See Commission Opinion on the requests for the amendment of the Statute of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, presented by the Court, at paras. 28–29, COM 
(2011) 596 final (Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Commission Opinion]. See also Draft 
Amendments to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and to Annex I 
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There are at least three ways to ease the pressure: 
 Create a specialized trademark court to replace 
the General Court; 
 Create specialized trademark chambers at the 
General Court and/or the CJEU; or 
 Alter the existing composition, structure and/or 
procedures of the General Court and/or the 
CJEU. 
It seems likely that the EU will adopt a hybrid of the second 
and third options. 
The EU Commission and the CJEU have recently decided 
against creating a specialist trademark tribunal, primarily because 
it would not reduce the current backlog of cases quickly enough.162  
This reasoning, however logical, seems to be driven more by 
necessity than forward-planning. 
Instead, the EU Commission’s proposed solution is to increase 
the number of General Court judges by twelve to thirty-nine and to 
allow the creation of specialised chambers.163  This should at least 
give certain judges an opportunity to focus more on trademark law.  
However, it stops short of creating a specialist IP or trademark 
court with its own rules tailored to IP cases.  A more modest 
expansion of the CJEU’s judiciary is also likely, combined with 
some minor procedural changes.  The EU Commission (at the 
CJEU’s instigation) recommends increasing the number of judges 
in the Grand Chamber from thirteen to fifteen and appointing a 
Vice President to assist the President.164  Unfortunately, the 
evidence suggests that these tweaks are unlikely to go far enough.  
For example, the UK House of Lords European Union Committee 
has suggested that the maximum increase in efficiency that is 
possible to achieve from procedural change has already 
 
Thereto, 1, 2 (Mar. 28 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/ 
application/pdf/2011-04/projet_en.pdf. 
 162 See Commission Opinion, supra note 161, at paras. 28–29, 5 n.1. (explaining that the 
Civil Service Tribunal took two years to come into operation). 
 163 See id. at ¶ 32. 
 164 See id. at ¶¶ 16–18.  
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occurred.165  They propose that more drastic changes are now 
required.166 
It is hardly surprising that the EU has so far shied away from a 
radical overhaul of its trademark institutions.  However worthy, the 
EU trademark system is, for now at least, unlikely to attract as 
much political attention as the other challenges facing Europe.  
However, if the EU is to maintain confidence in its trademark 
systems, it will need to keep a watchful eye on how OHIM, the 
General Court and the CJEU interact.  The key will be to maintain 
and—to some extent—restore confidence in the consistency and 
efficiency of these institutions.  That will require investment: first 
by OHIM (and therefore its fee-paying users), to ensure that speed 
does not trump legal certainty; and secondly by EU taxpayers, to 
ensure that the General Court and the CJEU bring in sufficient IP 
talent to put trademark law in safe hands for the next twenty years. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS: EU TRADEMARK LAW AND ITS 
EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 
As the overview above seeks to demonstrate, the EU has in 
general made great strides in its harmonization and development of 
trademark law over the past twenty years.  There is every reason to 
believe that this trend will continue for the next twenty years, 
particularly if the necessary institutional and legislative reforms 
take place.  Having established its own strong foundations, there 
may now be an opportunity for EU trademark law to play a more 
global role.  It also seems likely that it will itself become 
increasingly subjected to external influence. 
 
 165 See HOUSE OF LORDS EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, 14TH REPORT OF SESSION 
2010–11, The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union, H.L. 128 at ¶ 88 
(Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ 
ldselect/ldeucom/128/128.pdf. 
 166 See id. 
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I. INSIDE-OUT 
To influence trademark law elsewhere across the globe, the EU 
must first seek to enter into multilateral treaties to encourage 
foreign countries to adopt EU trademark norms.  The Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) had been one such 
attempt.167  Certain developed territories (including the EU, the 
United States of America and Japan) sought to broker an 
international trade agreement to export high standards of IP 
protection worldwide, including in relation to anti-
counterfeiting.168  More than five years in the making, ACTA set 
out the procedures and measures necessary to enforce intellectual 
property rights and to counter large-scale infringements at 
borders.169 
But for all its grand designs, ACTA had two significant flaws.  
First, it was not a truly international agreement.  Key countries and 
regions were missing from the treaty, including China (where a 
significant proportion of the world’s counterfeits are 
manufactured) and the Middle East (which is a major distribution 
hub for Europe).170  Secondly, those responsible for ACTA failed 
to convince their critics that ACTA fairly balanced IP rights with 
fundamental freedoms.171  In this way, a seemingly well-
intentioned treaty was hijacked by anti-establishment sentiment.  
The European Parliament recently voted to reject ACTA, meaning 
that it cannot now become law in the EU—”the first time that [the 
European] Parliament [has] exercised its Lisbon Treaty power to 
 
 167 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Oct. 1, 2011, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf. 
 168 See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Partners Sign 
Groundbreaking Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter ACTA 
Press Release] available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2011/october/partners-sign-groundbreaking-anti-counterfeiting-t. 
 169 See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Joint Press 
Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Negotiating Parties (Oct. 2011), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/joint-
press-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag. 
 170 See ACTA Press Release, supra note 168 (showing that out of all ACTA negotiating 
parties, no Middle Eastern country was present).  
 171 See David Jolly, A Question of Internet Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/technology/06iht-acta06.html?pagewanted=all#.  
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reject an international trade agreement.”172 Controversially, this 
vote took place before the CJEU had the chance to consider 
ACTA’s compatibility with the EU treaties.173  Increased 
protection for EU trademark owners against international 
counterfeits is still some way off. 
Secondly, the EU could leverage its relationship with the WTO 
to develop a more detailed worldwide framework for trademark 
protection.  The EU, like the other 156 WTO members,174 is a 
party to TRIPS, which also incorporates the relevant parts of the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (the 
“Paris Convention”).175  The core rationale for TRIPS is similar to 
that for EU trademark law: harmonising IP protection should 
“reduce distortions and impediments to international trade” and 
competition.176 
Unsurprisingly, given the number of countries involved, 
harmonization of trademark law under TRIPS and the Paris 
Convention has been far more modest than within the EU.  These 
treaties, among other things, set out basic standards for trademark 
registrability177 and infringement,178 and prohibit discrimination 
against foreigners’ IP protection.179  However, many of the 
relevant provisions remain optional or only set minimum 
standards.180  Despite the wide reach of TRIPS and the Paris 
Convention, there is still considerable scope for trademark 
 
 172 See Press Release, European Parliament, European Parliament Rejects ACTA (July 
4, 2012), available at  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/ 
20120703IPR48247/html/European-Parliament-rejects-ACTA (“478 MEPs voted against 
ACTA, 39 in favour, and 165 abstained.”).  
 173 See id. 
 174 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.  
 175 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197.  
 176 TRIPS Preamble, supra note 175, TMD, supra note 1, recital 2. 
 177 See Paris Convention, supra note 175, art. 6quinquies(B); TRIPS, supra note 175, at 
art. 15.  
 178 See TRIPS, supra note 175, at art. 16–17.  
 179 See id. at art. 4; Paris Convention, supra note 175, at art. 2(1). 
 180 See generally Paris Convention, supra note 175; TRIPS, supra note 175. 
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protection to vary across the world.  There is, in particular, sparse 
harmonization of the standard of protection afforded to well-
known marks.  Greater homogeneity would be most welcome.  
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that there will be much political 
appetite for broader global trademark reform, at least until the 
ACTA dust has settled. 
Thirdly, the EU could continue its educational approach to 
promoting its trademark norms by offering to support trademark 
law progress in developing countries.  This may have benefits for 
EU businesses that are looking to expand overseas and it could 
help to strengthen the EU’s trade relationships in emerging 
markets.  The correct approach to providing this support will 
depend on the country involved.  As the EU already takes an active 
role within WIPO, the best way to channel any such efforts may be 
through the Regional Bureaus of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization. 
II. OUTSIDE-IN 
While turning trademark law into the EU’s next global export 
is perhaps rather ambitious, there is every chance that EU 
trademark norms will find themselves increasingly influenced by 
foreign pressures.  For example, as a WTO member, the EU has 
already accepted trademark-related obligations under TRIPS. 
International law also has some indirect effect under EU law.  
Although the CJEU has held that the validity of EU laws cannot 
generally be assessed by reference to TRIPS,181 there are 
circumstances in which the CJEU will, where possible, interpret 
EU law in light of international treaty obligations.182  This rather 
 
 181 Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council of the European Union, 1999 ECR 
I-8395, ¶¶ 42–49; Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98, Parfums Christian Dior SA and 
Others, [2000] E.C.R. I-11307, ¶ 44; Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. 
Budĕjovický Budvar, národní podnik, [2004] E.C.R. I-10989, ¶ 54; Case C-491/01, The 
Queen v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco (Invs.) Ltd., 
2002 ECR I-11453, ¶¶ 154–56.   
 182 EU legislation must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent 
with international law, in particular where its provisions are intended specifically to give 
effect to an international agreement concluded by the EU. See, e.g., Case C-341/95, 
Gianni Bettati v Safety Hi-Tech Srl., [1998] ECR I-4355, ¶ 20; Case C-306/05, Sociedad 
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piecemeal approach to merging international and EU norms is 
uncomfortable and has the potential to create significant legal 
uncertainty.  Far more satisfactory would be for the CJEU to 
decide either that the EU’s international treaties have direct effect, 
or that they have no effect unless expressly transposed.  The 
former has the advantage of putting the EU at the forefront of 
compliance with international law, but will leave practitioners with 
the heavy burden of juggling international, EU and national laws.  
The latter would simplify the legal analysis but could expose the 
EU to accusations that it has breached its international 
commitments.  This tension will have increasing relevance as the 
EU continues its efforts to seek greater global trademark law 
harmonization.  Finding the right fit between international, EU and 
national trademark law may be one of the biggest challenges facing 
EU trademark jurists for the next twenty years. 
 
 
General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA., [2006] ECR I-
11519, ¶ 35).  In certain circumstances, the obligation may be limited to matters where 
EU law is intended to implement the relevant treaty obligations. See Joined Cases 403 & 
429/08, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. QC Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. I-___, at ¶ 186 
(delivered on Oct. 4, 2011) (not yet reported).  
